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1 INTRODUCTION
An idea currently held about the division of labour
within the social sciences is that the central theme in
many sociological theories is power while in eco-
nomics, by contrast, it is efficiency (for example, see
Baker 1990: 592). According to some authors, this
difference in focus determines radically opposed
approaches to social phenomena (ibid.). Can we
really say that economists are unconcerned with the
problem of power (with the well-recognized excep-
tion of 'market power' in the analysis of monopoly)
and that their focus on efficiency issues prevents
them from doing so? This is the question addressed
in this paper and to which we want to bring a more
balanced answer than the one suggested above.
At the start of our enquiry, there are two things
which need to be clarified. First, attention will be
exclusively focused on the dominant paradigm in
economics, namely, the neoclassical school starting
from the marginalist revolution in the last quarter of
the 19th century. Second, as there is apparently no
general consensus about what power means exactly,
we have to be precise about how the concept is used
throughout this paper. A useful starting point is
Elster's distinction between force and coercion, tak-
ing coercion to imply the presence of an intentional
agent or coercer, while force need not imply more
than the presence of constraints that level no room
for choice (Elster 1985: 211-2). We take it that force
is an abstract mechanism through which the imper-
sonal logic of an economic system limits the actors'
choices and affects their life situation. By power, we
mean what Elster calls coercion, that is, the fact that
a (powerful) agent, for his own benefit, drives an-
other agent to take a course of action that he would
not have followed in the absence of the first agent's
intervention. It is however important to distinguish
between two basic forms of power according to
whether the power act enhances or harms the influ-
enced agent's interests. Power is considered ex-
ploitative in the latter case while it is akin to a
leadership process in the former.
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The central thesis developed below is the following:
while, till recently, economists were essentially con-
cerned with analysing the (free) play of market
forces and their consequences, thus leaving power
(as defined above) outside their field of investiga-
tion, the same cannot be said of a host of recent
contributions based upon different assumptions
about the agents' behaviour and the constraints they
face. The first part of this thesis is expounded in
Section 2, and the second part in Sections 3 and 4. In
Section 3, the relevance for the analysis of power of
the concept of strategic rationality is highlighted. In
Section 4, its usefulness for dealing with problems of
asymmetric information (a potential source of power)
is demonstrated. Section 5 asks the question as to
whether economists analyse the state as a source of
power and Section 6 briefly concludes the article.
2 ECONOMIC FORCES IN GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM THEORY
General equilibrium theory belongs to the hard core
of modern economic theory. It is concerned with the
question as to how a large number of freely interact-
ing independent individuals can produce social or-
der instead of chaos, leading the economy to a
coherent disposition of resources. What bears em-
phasis here is that the participants in the market are
assumed to behave according to the dictates of para-
metric rationality, meaning that they react rather
mechanically (like mere automata) to the price sig-
nals which embody all the information they need to
determine their best choices (those that maximize
their individual utility). Within the framework of
perfect competition (which includes perfect infor-
mation),2 prices are unique and exogenous to the
agents, and no room is left for strategic and conflictual
behaviour calling for negotiated or cooperative solu-
tions. Because of the total transparency of the whole
economic system for each agent, 'perfect competi-
tion turns out, paradoxically, to be the absence of all
interaction among individuals' (De Villé 1990: 16).
2 Note that uncertainty and risk are also allowed in this framework
and are usually dealt with by postulating a complete set of future and
contingent markets. This ingenious procedure amounts to reducing
uncertainty to a situation analytically equivalent to certainty.
The competitive economy is thus considered as an
abstract mechanism which, given individual pref-
erences and technology, yields equilibrium prices
and quantities on each market. By so doing, it also
establishes for each individual agent a one-to-one
relationship between his initial endowment and his
welfare. Viewed in this perspective, the poverty of
some agents is not to be ascribed to any malevolent
act of determinate (powerful) actors, but to the
concurring effects of their low initial endowment
and the force des choses expressed in the implacable
and cold logic of the anonymous market. The sources
of current income and wealth inequality can be
located not only in the initial distribution of endow-
ment, but also in different preference configurations
(in particular, agents who are relatively risk-averse
and cautious or have a strong preference for present
consumption end up poorer, on average, than agents
with opposite characteristics) and in the current state
of the technology (think of the low wages resulting
from the non-availability of labour-intensive tech-
nologies in a context of labour abundance). Yet, by
considering all these factors and their possible vari-
ations either as exogenous or as resulting from the
voluntary decisions of freely interacting agents, the
neoclassical economist prevents himself from ex-
ploring the root causes of inequality and, more
relevant to our purpose, he completely bypasses the
issue of power.
Consider the modern analysis of exploitation by
Roemer (1988): according to his definition, an indi-
vidual is exploited in the capitalist system if he
would be better off by withdrawing with an average
share of the capital stock. Exploitation thus results
from an unequal distribution of capital assets. Clearly,
in his theory, Roemer is concerned with the twin
issues of exploitation and inequality, but not with
power as such. This does not mean that the author
negates power as a possible cause of exploitation,
simply, his analytical approach does not allow him
to say anything meaningful about it. Likewise, by
taking preferences as given,3 economists are shut-
ting any possibility of analysing power in the form of
preference manipulation (such as when a country
uses food aid to change the preferences of the receiv-
ing country so as to make it structurally dependent
on its food supplies in the future). Moreover, since
the rules of the market game are assumed to be
equally given, the possibility of their having been
3 In this respect, it is particularly revealing that economists have not
been able to integrate within the theoretical kernel of their paradigm
the main lessons from the sub-discipline known as marketing. Given
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imposed in a coercive fashion is ruled out, This is
well attested by colonial history: the Indian artisan
whose trade was ruined by British textiles forcefully
imported into India in the name of free trade was
surely the victim of a power act. To take another
(extreme) example, slavery is logically considered
by economists just as a particular configuration of
property rights, in which the slave-owner has prop-
erty in others' labour.
Can we say that, because of some intrinsic conserva-
tism, general equilibrium theorists are inherently
reticent to admit the existence of power behind the
scree of the 'market order'? No clear-cut answer can
be given to this question. On the one hand, if they are
unwilling to address this issue of power, it is mainly
because, given their analytical apparatus, they do
not see any fruitful way to elaborate on it. Neglect of
power phenomena is thus to be traced not to any
(inherently conservative) ideological stance, but to
the working logic of their scientific paradigm. As
attested by (normative) welfare theory economists
can adopt a progressive approach when they discuss
the possibility of altering the distribution of income
through appropriate transfers in the form of taxes
and subsidies. Yet, note carefully that the
redistributor (the state, or, in the metaphoric lan-
guage used by economists, the 'benevolent and
omniscient planner') is not conceived as a powerful
actor but as an abstract mechanism.
On the other hand, economists do not form an
homogeneous milieu, and a group of them - very
vocal and well-publicized, yet not as numerous as is
often believed - is allergic to any analysis that leaves
room for coercive acts. In this so-called contractarian
strand of thought, the world is viewed as an arena
where agents freely contract or refuse to do so and,
whenever explicit transactions are not identifiable,
implicit deals are posited to save the 'model': all
human interactions reduce to contracts. A vivid
illustration of this 'economistic' or 'reductionist'
approach is provided by the neoclassical theory of
feudalism (North and Thomas 1973: 29-30). Here,
the lord-serf tie is construed as an exchange relation
in which the lord provides defence services in return
for the labour of the serf. According to this account,
feudalism 'is a system of exchange in which each
factor or agent receives a return that is necessary for
that factor or agent to supply its services'. What is
one of its objectives which is to study the preference formation
process, marketing science benefits more from the teachings of
psychology than from the economic theory.
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more interesting is that, 'even the coercion of the
serfs could be viewed as the outcome of a prior
implicit contract between serfs and lords in which
the serfs agreed to be coerced by the lord, knowing
that in their myopic self-interest, they would other-
wise act as free riders, and ultimately deprive them-
selves of the public goods they needed. Serfs, like
Ulysses in his attempt to avoid the sirens, agreed to
have themselves chained to the mast for fear of
otherwise acting in self-destructive ways' (Roemer
1988: 31). Coercion being self-imposed, power is
ruled out.
In the neoclassical theory of slavery, to take another
illuminating example, the problem is again posed in
contractual terms (see, e.g., Fenoaltea 1984; Bergstrom
1971; Barzel 1977, 1989). Thus, Barzel admits that,
since the term 'contract' implies a voluntary rela-
tionship, it fits forced slavery 'less well' than volun-
tary slavery, yet he immediately adds that, neverthe-
less, 'the notion of a slave contract is still useful in
analysing the institution of slavery' (Barzel 1989:77).
Many economists dealing with slavery (with the
notable exception of Fenoaltea for whom pain incen-
tives would stimulate higher levels of productivity
than ordinary rewards) believe that under normal
conditions productivity of slave labour ought to be
lower than that of free wage labour. Their question
is then why slaves did not buy out their contract
more often (an act called manumission) or, on the
contrary, given that the law afforded owners nearly
absolute rights over their slaves, how some of the
latter actually succeeded in acquiring property rights
to their own labour. Transaction costs - that is,
supervision and policy costs arising from asymmet-
ric information (see below) - typically occupy cen-
tre-stage in the answers given to the last question
and in attempts to explain the demise of slavery.
Completely bypassed is therefore the important role
of political and ideological factors not only in sus-
taining a socially inefficient institution that favoured
a dominant class but also in causing its eventual
abolition (for example, see Kolchin 1987).
3 MARKET POWER AND STRATEGIC
RATIONALITY
As is well known, monopoly behaviour has always
attracted the attention of economists as the polar
opposite of the competitive market. In recent dec-
ades, milder forms of market power, usually sub-
4 Particularly relevant to our topic are the many analyses of the
prime-mover advantage in price setting in an oligopolistic structure,
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sumed under the name 'oligopoly', have come to the
forefront of economic theory.4 Power is clearly at
stake here, since the monopolist, due to his privi-
leged position, extracts as much surplus as he can
from the consumers by manipulating prices or quan-
tities. Contrary to what has been noted with respect
to the competitive market, economy analysis of mar-
ket power provides clues about the origin of the
concentration of resources which characterizes mo-
nopoly or oligopoly: increasing returns to scale,
legal barriers to entry (e.g. regulations aiming at
protecting innovative activities), better ability of
small groups to organize and collude, etc.
In recent years, the concept of market power has
been considerably enlarged owing to a major break-
through in economic theory which followed upon
the development of (mathematical) game theory.
This methodological revolution has led economists
to introduce a new concept of rationality, known as
strategic rationality. Instead of the agents being
conceived as facing given prices to which they me-
chanically adjust their (optimal) plans - which de-
fines parametric rationality in the general equilib-
rium tradition - they are now viewed as actors who
optimize by considering explicitly the effect of their
own behaviour on market variables. An economic
transaction now appears as an interaction among
identifiable agents who are able, like in a chess game,
to anticipate all the possible sequences of moves and
countermoves and to define an appropriate plan of
action (called a 'strategy') given the possible reac-
tions of the other transactors. Thus, for example, a
monopolist no longer faces an impersonal demand
curve but customers endowed, say, with the capac-
ity to issue credible threats of taking actions harmful
to his interest. Clearly, the new methodology ena-
bles the economists to analyse problems of market
power in much richer and more varied ways than
was the case before. Its interest is also being increas-
ingly perceived by scholars from other social sci-
ences - such as sociology (Elster 1989; Coleman
1990), political science (Ostrom 1990; Farquharson
1969; Kramer 1977; Ferejohn 1978) and experimental
psychology (Dawes and Thaler 1988) - who use
game-theoretical concepts to approach a wide class
of social phenomena.
A vivid illustration of the kind of power phenomena
which the new approach allows one to address is
provided by Basu's analysis of power exercised
sometimes referred to as a von Stackelberg leadership (see Tirole
1988).
through 'triadic' relationships in agrarian econo-
mies (Basu 1986; see also Grossman 1991 and
Skaperdas 1992). In his framework, 'what appears
to be a voluntary exchange may be indirectly coer-
cive' (ibid.: 260). For instance, it is possible that the
landlord in offering an all-or-nothing contract to a
tenant gives - along with it - the threat that if the latter
does not accept his conditions, he will ensure that a
third person will refuse to trade with him. If the
landlord has the ability to influence this third party,
the threat becomes credible and the tenant is forced
into accepting a deal which clearly puts him at a
disadvantage (ibid.: 267-74).
To shift to a more 'political' manifestation of power,
let us now consider the case of a 'classical dictator-
ship'. As explained by Basu, if an unwanted ruler
punishes whoever does not comply with his wishes
and if the agony of punishment is greater than the
benefits an individual gets from non-compliance, no
individual would choose to disobey and the ruler
would survive to the misfortune of all. This holds
true even though everybody would be happier if
everybody would decide to disobey the ruler in a
coordinated way, thereby causing his overthrowing
(ibid.: 260-1). People are obviously locked into a sub-
optimal equilibrium supported by self-reinforcing
expectations (Bardhan 1989:14). Put in another way,
even though power appears concentrated in one
person (or group of persons) - the dictator - it is the
expectations of his subjects and their inability to
organize collectively and not the dictator's repres-
sive strength that makes his power self-sustaining.
In actual fact, in Basu's framework, the dictator
needs not even personally threaten his subjects if he
can rely on a set of coercive social norms or ideologi-
cal beliefs which sustain the power equilibrium: this
happens if everyone thinks not only that it is wrong
to disobey but also that it is his duty to punish any
other who might disobey. Of course, such consistent
self-reproducing beliefs need not support perverse
equilibria of the above kind, they may also support
benign equilibria (see Platteau 1993). The kind of
power under consideration is therefore the collec-
tive outcome of the individual behaviour of all
members in the society.
Two things may be further noted. First, such a
characterization is typical of the economic approach
5 Kuran has actually used the economic approach to explain why
political revolutions always catch the world by surprise. A society can
be on the brink of a revolution indefinitely, without anyone knowing
this, yet a revolution can suddenly occur with a relatively minor shift
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in which 'there is no actor named "society"; mass
action results form multitudes of individual choices'
(Kuran 1991: 10). This being said, the individual
agent need not be a single person but may consist of
a group (for example, the dictator could be a ruling
class), provided that group behaviour can be shown
to consistently derive from the rational behaviour of
its members. This is not an easy task since, before
assuming that an aggregate of individuals acts as a
group, one has to show how the collective action (or
free-rider) problem is effectively surmounted; that
is, how individual members can forsake their short-
term self-interest to enhance the group's interest
and, thereby, their own long-term selfish interest
(see Olson 1965; Elster 1989; Coleman 1990; Nabli
and Nugent 1989; etç.). Second, as Basu, Jones and
Schlicht (1987) have aptly emphasized, the above
kind of economic analysis does not say anything
about the origin of power: attention is focused on
demonstrating how power is reproduced although
everyone - except the dictator - would like to see it
destroyed.
To conclude, thinking in strategical terms (as was
indeed well understood by sociologists such as Cro-
zier and Friedberg(1977) and Bourdieu (1980;1987))
is a promising way of highlighting the mechanics of
power. As a matter of fact, power is now placed
within the context of an encounter between active
opponents. The comparative weakness of the domi-
nated or poor .agent does not arise from his passivity
but rather from his inability to make credible threats
of making moves that would improve his relative
position. Note carefully that the interest of the new
approach does not lay so much in its providing a
new interpretation of economic transactions in com-
petitive markets - in an atomistic universe, individu-
als cannot have any leverage on market prices - as in
its allowing analysis of a vast range of situations in
which a limited number of identifiable agents con-
sciously interact with one another.
4 POWER AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
A major revolution occurred in recent economic
thinking when economists questioned their stand-
ard assumption that information is public and per-
fectly (symmetrically) distributed among agents.
in the revolutionary threshold of a single agent (Kuran 1991).
Interestingly, the idea that collective behaviour is characterized by
threshold phenomena can be traced back to a sociologist (Granovetter
1978).
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Instead, they typically6 started to assume the oppo-
site situation of asymmetric information in which
agents holding private information are unwilling to
release it because its dissemination would harm
their own selfish interests. Information, now under-
stood as a private good, becomes part of the agents'
private endowment and an important source and
instrument of power in economic transactions: for
their own benefits, agents seek to influence the oth-
ers' decision by hiding, partially revealing, distort-
ing or manipulating the pieces of information rel-
evant to them.
To illustrate, just think of a worker whose behaviour
cannot be costlessly monitored by his employer.7
Thanks to his control over information, the worker
once engaged can apparently increase his welfare at
the expense of his employer through labour shirking
(including feigned illness), output misreporting, in-
put pilfering, misuse or theft of productive assets,
etc. It would, however, be wrong to infer from this
that power is exclusively or even mainly in the hands
of information-controlling agents. To pursue the
above example, the employer may surmount the
incentive problem created by his workers by select-
ing labour-displacing production techniques. Mecha-
nization may thus appear as a major weapon used by
employers against troublesome workers. For in-
stance, in the Journal de Chartres of 28 July 1859, a
newspaper which was the mouthpiece of big land-
lords' interests in the Beauce area, we read: 'The day
when the first mechanical harvester will appear in
our countryside will mark the beginning of our
independence vis-a-vis the labourers ... The compe-
tition it will create will free the cultivators from the
despotic power wielded by these labourers' (from
Moulin 1988: 71). To take another example, certain
authors argue that the factory has been born as a
deliberate response by merchant entrepreneurs to
the pervasive incentive problems they were con-
fronted with in the putting-out system (North 1981:
167-8; Crouzet 1985: 46).
Another strategy is for the employers to divide the
labour force into two distinct tiers. In order to elicit
loyalty and trustworthiness from a first (privileged)
group of workers, they pay them a higher wage and
offer them longer contracts than they could other-
wise obtain. Such a strategy obviously leads to an
6 As noted byTirole, economists tend to overemphasize information
manipulation and, by so doing, they ignore the fact that even well-
intentioned members of an organization may have trouble
communicating because communication is too time-consuming or
because the information is hard to codify (Tirole 1988: 49).
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excess demand for the permanent jobs thus created
and the existence of the second group of workers -
unemployed or casual - serves to discipline the first
group. Based upon the principles of selectivity and
exclusion, thus subtle strategy uses the benefits con-
ferred on the permanent (or regularly employed)
workers as an instrument of control since they carry
with them the implicit or explicit threat of with-
drawal (see Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Eswaran and
Kotwal 1985; Hart 1986). Another example illustrat-
ing how asset-owning agents may devise contracts
that overcome various incentive problems arising
from asymmetric information is that of sharecrop-
ping in agrarian economies. Due to the existence of
such contracts, the landless get access to land, but
only at the cost of increasing the production risk they
have to assume (see, e.g., Otsuka, Chuma and
Hayami 1992).
Clearly control of information does not necessarily
confer decisive power over agents in possession of
critical production means, yet it must be emphasized
that asymmetric distribution of information imposes
an unavoidable loss on those agents. (In the above
examples, employers or landowners would have
obtained a higher income with alternative contracts
in a perfect-information world). Within the con-
tract-theoretical framework, power is typically fea-
tured as a confrontation between agents possessing
strategic information and agents possessing critical
(usually scarce) production factors. (For a notable
exception, see Bhaduri's model on usury in back-
ward agriculture (Bhaduri 1977) in which the land-
lord controls land, capital and information about
collateral value). This confrontation, which entails
social costs - i.e., it sustains a Pareto-inferior out-
come - takes the form of contractual or organiza-
tional mechanisms (the capitalist firm based on hier-
archical relations can be analysed as a form devised
to surmount various kinds of incentive problems
(see Coase 1937; and Williamson 1985)).
If the above line of approach is followed, the ques-
tion as to which party has the initiative or the ability
to design contracts becomes crucial for a deeper
understanding of the issue of power. For instance,
why is it that it is the bosses who engage the workers
and not the other way round (Marglin 1974)? Why
does the labour force accept the rules of the market
7 The worker-employer relationship is used here as a metaphor to
refer to a whole class of situations known as moral hazard issues
which may also characterize durable goods markets, insurance
markets, capital markets, or the financing and maintenance of public
goods.
even when they are clearly set against them? One
could thus imagine that, in the Shapiro-Stiglitz story,
workers would unite together and create a trade
union powerful enough to impose full employment
on the employers. Why is it that, in some sharecrop-
ping models, the share is an instrumental variable
controlled by the landlord, while in others it is
assumed to be exogenously given? This is not a
minor point since it hinges on the question as to
whether historical factors or social norms do or do
not constrain the landlords' space of manoeuvre (on
this, see the illuminating account provided by Scott
1985).
With respect to such questions, the basic limitation
of economic analysis is that it always requires a
minimal structure (rules) of the game to be set (Field
1984). This implies that decision powers (who de-
cides what) are clearly assigned to each agent and are
not allowed to change under the impact of endog-
enous forces. For instance, who engages whom,
whether the agents can refuse to transact or not,
what their reserve (withdrawal) option consists of,
what is exactly transacted between them, or which of
the two opponents can make the first proposal,... are
all framework conditions to be specified at the be-
ginning of the analysis. Therefore, although econo-
mists are now able to explain some economic phe-
nomena as resulting from the relative power of
interacting agents, they still have little to say about
the origin of power, that is, the origin of the oppor-
tunity sets and the fundamental rules which the
agents face in their economic transactions. That this
question of the origin is bypassed by economists is to
be ultimately traced to their analytical (as opposed to
holistic) approach whereby they derive rigorous
propositions from a set of well-defined assumptions
which just tell a 'plausible story' about the world.
5 THE STATE AS A COERCIVE AGENT?
Since the beginning, the role of the state in the market
economy has been at the centre-stage of the eco-
nomic debate. What is worth noting in the present
context is that, till recently, even the economists for
whom the state has significant functions to perform
tended to view it as an abstract mechanism or a
disembodied agent completely identified with the
society's collective interests. In this perspective, the
power dimension is completely absent from the
8 Thus, in a modelling effort that is representative of this approach,
Becker writes: 'I shall not try to model how different political systems
translate the activities of pressure groups into political influence.
17
economists' doctrine of the state: indeed, it does not
pursue any particular interest of its own and all it
does is to (costlessly) enforce its socially optimal
policies through a wide variety of instruments (taxes,
quotas, rules). It is an omnipotent agent whose
power vanishes from sight because it acts in a be-
nevolent way.
Increasingly, economists have started to question
the benevolent despot view of the state. Two fash-
ionable approaches today are known as the 'new
political economy' and rent-seeking theory. In the
former approach, the state is under the active pres-
sure of various interest groups or lobbies and its
decisions (rules, policies, taxes, subsidies, quotas)
are a pure reflection of the comparative strength of
these groups. It is an abstract meeting point of all the
different 'pressures' or 'forces' which represent con-
tradictory interests present in the society. The state
is a production function, a black box,8 which trans-
forms the different pressures in a unique outcome
and the 'groups compete for political influence by
spending time, energy, and money on the produc-
tion of political pressure'. (Becker 1983: 377).
Note that some authors have attempted to explain
why the ability to organize for lobbying purposes
differs among various population groups. This is
clearly the key issue in Olson's analysis of 'logic of
collective action' where small group size is claimed
to be a major advantage to overcome the free-rider
problem in organizing (Olson 1965). This analytical
track has been followed to explain the compara-
tively great strength of the agricultural lobbies in
advanced countries (an approach known as 'the
political economy of agricultural protection' - for
example, see Gale Johnson 1988; Anderson and
Hayami 1986); to vindicate greater devolution of
power to village communities for the management
of local-level environmental resources (Wade 1988;
Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 1993); or, in a
more ambitious way, to account for the relative
stagnation of old industrialized countries subject to
the crippling pressures of powerful interest groups
(Olson 1982). Such analyses, it is worth observing,
are not exclusively concerned with the mechanics of
power: insofar as they highlight some source(s) of
differential abilities to organize, they also shed light
on the origin of collective power.
Instead, I deal with the end product of such a translation, called
"influence functions", that relate subsidies and taxes to the pressures
exerted by all groups and to other variables' (Becker 1983: 375).
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In the second approach, by virtue of the fact that it
uses non-price mechanisms to allocate scarce re-
sources, the state creates rents (e.g., through licens-
ing) that become a source of wasteful competition
among potential entrepreneurs (Krueger 1974). The
state is prone to make 'mistakes' that create rents, yet
these mistakes are left unexplained. Government is
simply assumed to give rise to 'government fail-
ures'. In an extension of this approach, the state is a
particular agent holding monopoly power which it
uses arbitrarily in order to capture the rents associ-
ated with it. Instead of the benevolent despot of the
classical model, the abstract locus of the political
economy approach, or the mistake-maker of the
rent-seeking theory, the state now appears as a
wrongdoer bent upon draining resources away from
the public for its own vested benefit.
Public choice theory represents an older (normative)
approach to the state which has gained well-estab-
lished recognition in the economic profession. It
consists of analysing the process of political deci-
sion-making under the democratic system and of
designing rules that ensure that the best-preferred
outcome will emerge from this process. Particularly
relevant to our topic is the analysis of political parties
as competing oligopolists trading in votes: accord-
ing to this logic, each party lays down its political
platform with a view to attracting as many votes as
possible. The political arena is thus viewed as a
'political market' in which politicians behave like
merchants in approaching voters. Because of its
contractarian perspective, this approach evades the
issue of power: the state appears just as a channel
through which the preferences of the public con-
cerning goods get expressed. The state has therefore
no sui generis power - it is the voice of the majority -
as in the case of the benevolent despot doctrine -
where it is the voice of the social interest. The same
can also be said of the political economy approach
(here power is entirely in the hands of interest groups)
but not of a certain interpretation of the rent-seeking
theory in which the state is an active monopolist. All
the above approaches, it has to be admitted, contrib-
ute to our understanding of political power, yet, the
striking fact is that they do not amount to a unified
theoretical corpus about the working of the state in
the market economy.
9 For an illustration of a rather sterile approach by an economist to
the problem of power and conflict, see Skaperdas 1992.
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6 CONCLUSION
In view of the above analysis, it is not true to say that
economists are unconcerned with the issue of power.
The remarkable fact is that, even though power is not
a stated preoccupation of the economic science, it
has entered its field through the backdoor. This is
mainly as a result of the evolution of the methodol-
ogy used by economists which has allowed them to
consider competition in a new light: a single agent
faces not the impersonal forces of competition but
identifiable opponents subject to influence. This
new way of thinking has penetrated into many sub-
fields of the discipline which explains why the issue
of power is being addressed from a variety of ana-
lytical angles. Different forms of power therefore
emerge from recent economic writings, such as:
triadic or multilateral sanction or reputation mecha-
nisms; divisive tactics; leadership as a first-mover
mechanism; lobbying by interest groups; manipula-
tion of prices or information; contractual designing;
or the use of credible threats based on strong repu-
tation. In most cases, power is to be understood in
the exploitative sense although in some cases (like in
the study of first-mover mechanisms) power as-
sumes the form of a leadership process.
However, as is also evident from our presentation,
the economic approach has its own limitations. In
particular, mainly due to its abstract mode of analy-
sis, it tends to focus on the mechanisms whereby
power is exerted and reproduced while paying little
attention to the basic question of its origin and
formation. Moreover, again for reasons related to
their methodology, economists completely bypass
the symbolic dimension of power phenomena which
remains the exclusive province of sociology (for
example, Balandier 1992; Bourdieu 1980; Douglas
1986). If economists can deal with a wide range of
social phenomena, including that of power, they
always look at them from a particular angle deter-
mined by their specific analytical approach. Where
their strength lies is also their weakness: their analy-
sis may produce powerful insights (if the problem is
posed in an interesting way)9 and well-articulated
results, yet it falls far short of a complete view of the
matter and it is even liable to overlook aspects that
others may rightly deem essential.
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